Publications and Working Papers
"Reference Dependence and Goal Motivation: Evidence From Online Chess", Jeffrey R. Zeidel (Job Market Paper). (link)
In online chess, players are assigned ratings that measure chess skill and update after every game. I find evidence of bunching above round numbers in the distribution of ratings, suggesting that players care about their rating and that round numbers serve as reference points. I estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to end a playing session that nests both loss aversion and an alternative `aspiration' specification involving a discrete jump in utility at reference points. I reject loss aversion in favor of aspirational preferences. I show that higher skilled players are significantly more aspirational, and that aspiration does not diminish with experience. While higher skilled players play longer sessions on average, model comparative statics suggest that this is not explained by heterogeneity in aspirations.
"Games Played by Teams of Players", Kim Jeongbin, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Jeffrey R. Zeidel. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 (link)
We develop a general framework for the analysis of games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines standard non-cooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on the collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with
some binary action games.